Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1941

H. M. Gribble v. Emma Cowley : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
J. Vernon Erickson; Attorney for Defendant and Respondent;
W. D. Beatie; Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Gribble v. Cowley, No. 6224 (Utah Supreme Court, 1941).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/621

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

JNTHE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

'"H. M. GRIBBLE,
Plaintiff and .Awelloot,

No.6224

vs.
~.'

liDS. EMMA COWLEY,
DefefliJant ami}, Respondent.

lppeal from Seventh District Court of Sanpete County,
·

Utah, Honorable John A. Hougaard, Judge.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

J. VERNON ERICKSON,
.Attorney for Defendcvnt am.d Bespofflldent;

ED;,,

w. DEidj,
· 11Ttt~&;~ R

·i

Appellamt.

C:EH I 4 1(\£11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Cases Cited
Page
Black

YS.

Rocky nit. Bell Tel. Co.,

~6

Utah 451, 73

Pac. 514 ·····-·-·············-················-······----------------·····-··--··-··········-····-··--------------Cargil vs. Atwood, 18 R. I. 303, '27 Atl. :.n4....·-··················--······
Hamilton vs. Snyder, 182 \Vash. 688,48 Pac. (2nd) 245
Harlan vs. Taylor, (Cal.) 33 Pac. (2nd) 422..... ·------------·····-··
Hughes vs. \Yarman Steel Casting Co., (Cal.) 163

16
5
17
19

Pac. 885 ·····-·-··------··-------·····-·-----------··············-···--·-·····-·-·-·········-·······-·-····-·······4-5
Jensen vs. Utah Ry. Co., 7'2 Utah 366, 270 Pac. 349.....-.. 18
LaFargue vs. United Railroads of San Francisco,
(Cal.) 192 Pac. 538......--------------------------·-····--·-··············-·······--······-··········· 12
Mast vs. Claxton, 107 Cal. 59, 290 Pac. 48.........----·······-------------- 11
Metcalf vs. Romano, (Cal.) 257 Pac. 114................................-.. 10
Moulton vs. Staats et al., 83 Utah 197, 27 Pac. (2nd)
455 ··-···-·-····-··-··-···-·-··········-···········································-················-··········-····· 7
Ogden L. & I. Ry. Co. vs. Jones et al., 51 Utah 62, 168
Pac. 548 ·······························------·-------······-··-·-----·······-·······------·-----·-··················----- 15
Skeen vs. Skeen, 76 Utah 32, 287 Pac. 320..................______________ 11
Smith vs. Ogden & N. W. R. Co., 33 Utah 129, 93 Pac.
185 ·····---···········------------················-················-···-----···················-····-·······-·-··········· 5
Woolsey vs. Ziegler, ( Okl.) 123 Pac. 164........----·-··-·······-·--···-·· 12

Text Books
Abbott's Trial Brief, Civil Jury Trials, Second Edition, page 484 ·················-··············---···-·-·-·························-------··--·-------·-······ 20
Bancroft Code Pleading, Vol. 4, Sec. 2046, page 3550... 4
Corpus Juris Secundum, Yol. 5, Sec. 1780, page 1173...... 14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
H. M. GRIBBLE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
No. 6224

vs.
MRS. EMMA COWLEY,
Defendant an~d Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
The plaintiff has appealed this action relying upon
two assignments of errors, namely, 1. That the evidence
is insufficient to justify the verdict in the particulars as
set forth in detail therein, and 2. Misconduct of the jury
in the particulars as set forth in detail therein.
Under these assignments of errors the appellant has
submitted a lengthy argument contending that the court
erred in denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial
in this action.

POINT "A"
Under point A as argued by the appellant the fact is
not disputed by defendant that if contributory negli-
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gence is relied on that it must be plead, but in this action
the defendant did not rely on contributory negligence
as a defense. To the complaint filed by the plaintiff
charging the defendant with negligence causing the death
of William Hale Gribble, this defendant entered an answer denying any negligence on her part for the injury
and death of the said William Hale Gribble.
The material allegations of the plaintiff's complaint
in this action were in substance: That Mrs. Cowley, the
defendant, was operating an automobile in a northerly
direction upon the public highway at about the hour of
3:15P.M. on the 13th day of December, 1937, at a point
within Gunnison City on which is known as the San Pitch
Bridge, that she was driving said automobile carelessly
and negligently in the following manner: That she was
going in excess of 40 miles per hour; that she carelessly
and negligently failed to keep a careful or any lookout
for persons along and upon said highway; that she failed
to have said automobile under her control and negligently and carelessly drove and operated .said automobile to
the extreme east edge of the paved portion of said bridge
and failed to operate said automobile with sufficient
clearance to the left of the deceased, and failed to give
any signal whatsoever of her intention to pass said deceased upon his left ; that the deceased, was then and
there travelling on a bicycle in a northerly direction along
and upon the east portion of the said highway crossing
the San Pitch Bridge approximately in the center and
about one foot West of the East edge of the paved portion of the Highway on the said bridge, and was then
2
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and there exercising due care and caution for his own
safety. That the defendant. by reason of her aforesaid
negligence, caused said autonwbile to strike upon and
against the bicycle of the deceased and his body which
resulted in the injury from which he later died.
The testimony of the defendant, relating to the court
and the jury the detail of how this accident occurred
(Ab. 35-38) and on cross examination (Ab. 39-50) did
not disclose any neg·ligence on her part but was to the
effect that she was travelling upon the highway, using
due care, that she had her car under control, that she was
travelling about 25 miles per hour as she approached the
San Pitch Bridge, that she was keeping a careful lookout
for persons along and upon the highway, and that this
boy darted out on his bicycle and she sounded her horn
as she approached to pass him turning her car over to
the west side of the highway so as to pass him and that
he turned his bicycle into her car and she whirled to
avoid him but could not.
Her testimony was not refuted. Nor was there any
evidence introduced by the plaintiff which in any way
proved any negligence on her part.
Then there is the testimony of the defendant's witness, Mildred Mclff, an eye witness to the accident (Ab.
50-51) whose testimony was to the effect that she saw
the boy on his bicycle, saw the car approach, and saw the
boy turn his bicycle into the car.
This undisputed evidence that the deceased turned
his bicycle into the defendant's car went into the record
without objection by the plaintiff. And it is this evidence

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that plaintiff is stressing as being evidence of contributory negligence and therefore being improper evidence
for the jury to consider.. But plaintiff alleged as a material allegation in his complaint that the deceased was
travelling upon his bicycle upon said highway exercising
due care and caution for his own safety, which allegation
was denied by the defendant in her answer, and certainly any evidence which would tend to disprove the
plaintiff's material allegations was certainly admissible
under the pleadings.
Under defendant's answer of denial, which specifically denied each and all of the plaintiff's allegations of
negligence set up in his complaint, defendant contends
that she had the right to introduce evidence that would
defeat the plaintiff's claims.
Bancroft Code Pleading, Volume 4, page 3550, Sec.
2046, states :
''Answer generally-In an action based upon
negligence the defendant may, of course, plead any
defense which he has, even though they be not wholly consistent, as in case of a denial of negligence and
an allegation of contributory negligence, subject to
the general limitations elsewhere discussed. Matters of affirmative defense must be specially pleaded,
such as an act of God, but this is not necessary with
respect to matters which are covered by denials of
the facts alleged. Thus a denial of any negligence on
the part of the defendant warrants proof that the
injury was solely due to the negligence of the plaintiff, without the necessity of a plea of contributory
negligence. ''
In support of this is the case of Hughes v. Warman
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Steel Casting Company, a ease decided by the Supreme
Court of the State of California reported in 163 Pacific,
page 885, in which it was hel< 1 that defendant having in
its ans\Yt>r denied all negligc>lh'e on its part, this plea,
though denominated a special defense, is simply an affirmative charge of negligence on the part of the plaintiff which was available under the general issue without
special ;plea, and the evidence respecting it would have
to be considered with all the other evidence in the case in
determining whether it justified a verdict for the plaintiff, which the jury, of course, did.
See also Cargil v. Atwood, 18 R.I. 303, 27 Atl. 214, to
the effect that the general issue puts plaintiff upon proving his whole case, and entitles defendant, without special
notice, to give evidence of anything which shows that
plaintiff ought not to recover.
And in the case of Smith vs. Ogden & N. W. R. Co.,
33 Utah, 129; 93 Pac. 185, the case cited by appellant in
his brief is directly in support of the defendant's contentions in this case, to-wit:
''That the plaintiff is required to allege and
prove negligence on the part of the defendant, and
that such negligence, as a natural and direct result,
occasioned the injury.''
and further:
"Under the general issue, the defendant may introduce any evidence which tends to disprove the
negligence charged against him, or which tends to
disprove the casual connection of his negligence and
the injury. ''
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There was no testimony or evidence introduced in this
case that brought out any negligence on the part of the
defendant. While on the other hand there was evidence
introduced which showed that the deceased turned his
bicycle into the defendant's car, tending to show that the
deceased was not using due care as plaintiff had alleged,
and further tending to show the defendant's freedom from
negligence in the matter. We contend that defendant had
a right in proving her freedom from negligence to introduce any evidence showing how the accident occurred, and
such evidenceand testimony did go into the record without objection by the plaintiff or his counsel.
It is well settled as frequently stated by the courts
that under a general denial in an answer that the defendant may make any defense that vrill defeat plaintiff's claim. While on the other hand a person pleading
contributory negligence thereby admits his own negligence in the case and seeks to avoid responsibility by
reason of the claim that the other party contributed to
his own negligence. That, however, ~as not the case at
all before the court. The evidence of the defense in this
case all the way through, showed absolutely that the injury and death of the boy in this case was purely accident as it were as far as the defendant is concerned. That
was unavoidable and no responsibility could be placed
upon the defendant by reason thereof. And this was the
verdict reached by the jury in this case when they returned a verdict in favor of the defendant of no cause
of action.
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POINT "B"
Under point B, appellant has sub1nitted argument on
the duty of the jury to follow the eourt 's instruction. We
do not contend that it was not the duty of the jury to
follow the court's instruction, and certainly the appellant
has not presented any evidence to show that the jury in
this action did not follow the instructions of the court.
The Appellant has cited the case of Moulton vs.
Staats, et al., reported in 83 Utah 197, 27 Pac. (2nd) 455.
This is an action where the jury were instructed that if
the issues were found against the plaintiff and in favor
of defendant, that all the defendants would be entitled
to was on their counterclaim in the sum of $886.50. And
that if they found in favor of the plaintiff and against
defendants, the defendants w:ould be entitled to a .set-off
in the sum of $886.50. The jury returned their verdict
in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $2500.00. However,
it was the intention of the jury to render a verdict for the
defendant on their counterclaim of $886.50, same to be
offset against the $2500.00, leaving a balance of $1614.00
for plaintiff. And the Jury showed by affidavit that it
was an oversight on their part to fail to find a verdict
for the defendants on their counterclaim.
There can be no dispute that in the case above cited
there was an apparant disregard by the jury of the instruction given by the Court. But this case is not in point
with the case at bar. There is no evidence here that the
jury disregarded the instruction of the court.
The testimony of the juror, Mr. Lowry, on Cross
Examination (Tr. 142) was very definite that the jury
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did follow the court's instructions, quoting from that testimony:

"Q. Mr. Lowry, did the jury follow and go over
the court's instructions~
A. Yes, sir.
Q!. And you arrived at your verdict from his
instructions~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. And you accept the law as His Honor gave
you1
A.

Yes, sir."

The jury had the right to consider the evidence introduced in determining whether Mrs. Cowley was negligent, and if her negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury, as instructed by the court. Although it is clear
from the evidence that the question of William Hale
Gribble's negligence in comparison with any negligence
of the defendant was not the issue upon which the Jury
obta.ined their verdict, the evidence shows there was some
discussion as to this. But the evidence also shows that
the verdict was reached upon the question of whether or
not the defendant was negligent, and the jury unanimously found that the defendant was not negligent, and,
therefore, reached their verdict of no cause of action.

POINT "C"
On his point C, appellant contends that the trial court
erred in refusing to grant the motion for new trial, which
contention respondent must earnestly reject. This motion
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was made on two grounds, nan1ely, 1, Misconduct of the
jury. :2. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict, and that the yerdict is ap:ni·1st the law.
Affidavits of the mother of the deceased and her
sister-in-law were filed in support of such motion, attempting to show the alleg·ed Iniscondnrt of the jury in the
jury room. At the hearing of this motion the following
evidence ·was broug·ht before the court:
In the first place we have the evidence of Mrs. Gribble, the mother of the boy who was killed as stated in this
action, saying that during· the deliberation of the jury she
and her sister-in-law were on the sidewalk in front of
the court house, the jury room being upstairs, and that
she heard a discussion of voices from the jury room, but
could not recognize the voices. She could not positively
testify that it was even one of the jurors whose voice she
heard but she claimed that the effect of the statement or
statements was upon the question of the relative negligence as beween Mr.s. Cowley and the boy who was killed
in the accident. But that was all she claimed that she
heard-nothing more. (Ab. 58-59.)
Her sister-in-law, Mrs. Gladys Nielson claimed that
.she heard practically the same thing but she could not say
positively as to who made the statement or even whether
it was a juryman or somebody else. (Ab. 59-60-61.)
Now as an attempt to identify and bring to the court
evidence as to such statements having been made in substance plaintiff called two of the jurors before the court
in this case, namely, Mr. King and Mr. Lowry and questioned them upon a purported talk or discussion upon the
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question of the relative negligence between the parties
mentioned. One juror said there was a great deal of talk
upon that, the other jun'r said there was a little conversation upon that but there was no vote taken upon that
matter, no determination whatever resulted upon that
phase of their discussion.
I quote from Mr. Lowry's testimony upon direct examination by Mr. Beatie (Ab. 62-63) :

'' Q. I will ask you this then: Isn't it a fact that
most of the time during the deliberations of the jury
on that ,particular evening was the discussion as between the fact that William Hale Gribble was negligent, and that Mrs. Cowley was also negligent, and
that William Hale Gribble was more negligenU
A. No, sir, that is not a fact.
Q. What would you say that was~
A. The most of the discussion was as to whether
Mrs. Cowley was negligent or not.
Q. It iR a fact, however, there was a discussion
as to the negligence of William Hale GribblP'
A. A little discussion, but no ballots taken.''
If that constituted misconduct then under the law of
this State it could not possibly and cannot possibly be
received by the court in this action in support of the
motion upon the positive and well attested law to the
effect that a juryman will not be permitted to impeach
his own verdict.
It was held in the case of Metcalf v. Romano, decided
by the Supreme Court of California, and reported in 257
Pacific, Page 114, that expressions of individual juror
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during deliberations prior to arriving at verdict, in action for death of seven year old boy struck by automobile, held not sufficient reason for setting aside verdict
for plaintiff and g-ranting new trial, as showing prejudice
against defendant. FrOin that ease 1 quote:
''The action of the trial court in refusing to grant
a new trial on account of the alleged prejudice of
one of the trial jurors must be upheld. It does not
appear from the transcript or briefs how many of
defendant's peremptory challenges were used, the
record saying one or more was exercised. Whether
or not the jury was polled on the rendering of the
verdict does not appear. The motion was heard on
the affidavits of two of the jurors and the attorney
for defendants. If verdicts could be set aside because of the expressions of individual jurors during
their deliberations prior to arriving at a verdict a
procedure novel in the administration of justice
would be introduced, for by a long line of decisions
of the appellate courts of this and many other states
it is held that verdicts cannot be impeached by the
affidavit of jurors.''
In the case of Skeen v. Skeen, reported in 76 Utah,
page 32, it was held that ordinarily, new trial is not
granted for remarks in jurors' hearing, where neither
successful party nor jurors were at fault, unless remarks
probably influenced verdict.

In the case of Mast v. Claxton, 290 Pacific 48, 107
Cal. 59, it was held that to justify new trial for misconduct of juror, it must be shown that prejudice resulted
or that juror gave wilfully untruthful answer.
It is only where the verdict of a jury cannot be justi-
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fied, upon any hypothesis presented by the evidence that
it should be set aside on the ground that it is a compromise verdict. See Woolsey v. Ziegler, 123 Pacific 164;
(Oklahoma Case).
LaFargue v. United Railroads of San Francisco, a
California case reported in 192 Pacific, page 538, where a
juror was guilty of violating the instructions of the court
in asking certain questions and making statements, upon
which it was charged that he thus openly prejudiced the
case and expressed his criticism to his fellow jurors.
Upon this matter the District Court of Appeal in deciding this case said:
''We are willing to concede that the juror was
guilty of a violation of the instruction of the court
and of his duty as a juror in making the statements.
But we cannot go with appellant's learned counsel
to the extent of holding that the statements necessarily showed a prejudiced mind. Neither can we
concede that the incident could have ultimately affected the minds of intelligent jurors, as we must
assume the jurors who heard the statements to have
been, to the prejudice of the defendant's cause. The
whole matter was passed on by the trial court on motion for a new trial, and it was warranted in holding
that the conclusions of the juror thus hastily reached
and expressed, based as it was upon an absolutely
irrelevant fact, could not have operated to affect the
juror's mind in reaching a verdict.''
If that doctrine is applied which we believe will be
applied in this case, then what do we have~ We have the
testimony of Mr.s. Gribble and her sister-in-law that when
they were on the sidewalk during the time that the jury
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was deliberating in their room they heard some voices
which they could not tell or identify, to the effect that the
boy Gribble was more negligent or equally negligent as
they stated, with the defendaut, which certainly left at
that stage cannot possibly be used by the court in support of the assignment on the ground of misconduct of a
jury. It would be ridiculous, contrary to all precedent
to allo·w and permit such flimsy testimony not identified
as to the voices to be the basis of setting aside a verdict of
a jury.
Now as a matter of law, however, even if defendant
should admit the statements and that said statements and
arguments were made by the jury, then the question
would be as to whether or not that w:as misconduct that
prejudiced the minds of the jury. There was no issue
raised in this case as to contributory negligence. There
was a general denial of the acts of negligence as set forth
in the complaint. There was no claim whatever in this
case to the effect that Mrs. Cowley was negligent but a
direct denial of any acts of negligence in this rna tter and
under that general denial the defense had a right absolutely to show to the jury just how the unfortunate accident happened and in that evidence there was brought
forth an eye witness to the affair that absolutely showed
that by reason of the fact that the decedent swung his
bicycle into the automobile of Mrs. Cowley that the accident was absolutely unavoidable as far as the defendant
was concerned. That immediately after the accident she
stopped the car within a very short distance showing
that she had complete control of the car and turned
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around and came back to the scene of the accident. Surely in view of this and all of the evidence in the case the
jury certainly would ha·ve a right to deliberate and talk
about the evidence in the matter and in view of the fact
that the defendant in this case proved to the satisfaction
of the jury that she was innocent of negligence in this
matter and further that the accident did not happen by
reason of any error or negligent act of hers but was
absolutely caused by the person who was victim of the
sad affair.
If we were to follow the theory of the plaintiff in this
case defendant would not have been permitted even to
show how this accident haprpened. Now, again we take up
the matter to the effect that contributory negligence was
not an issue in the case. Consequently the mere fact that
there may have been sonie deliberation or talk hy the
jurors in this case as to the question of contributory negligence or the relative negligence as between the defendant and the decedent that would absolutely be immaterial
under the law when as a matter of fact there is no evidence whatever to show that the mind of any juror was
prejudiced thereby or that it resulted in or entered into
the decision or verdict of the jury in this case.
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 5, Sec. 1780, page
1173, upon the question of misconduct of jurors this doctrine is laid down :
''Misconduct of the jury or a juror may, like
error in practically any other particular, be either
rna terial and harmful, or immaterial and harmless.
Which it is to be determined on an examination by
the appellate court of the entire record.
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In order to authorize the setting aside of a verdict on account of n1isconduct, it must appear that
such misconduct tended to result in a substantial injury to the party complaining. Although jealous to
preserve the integTity of verdicts, the courts are not
on the alert for pretext to .set them aside and will
not scrutinize the subjective n1ental processes of the
jurors to ferret out prejudice from misconduct where
none is apparent. Intermediate improprieties in the
course of deliberation or discussion which obviously
do not continue into or have any effect on the verdict finally reached are harn1less; and on its appearing affirmatively that no juror was influenced
by the improper conduct, no significance will be attached to such conduct by the reviewing court. Mere
.speculation, in the course of discussion, as to what
a witness whose testimony was excluded would have
testified to had it been admitted will not be deemed
prejudicial. ' '
Referring to the question of what a juror may testify
to after the decision in any matter, the appellant has
cited the case of Ogden L. & I. Ry. Co. vs. Jones, et al.,
51 Utah 62 ; 168 Pac. 548. In this case the alleged misconduct of a juror during the deliberations of the jury
was attempted to be proved by the affidavit of the appellant and his counsel, in which it was shown that the
juror admitted certain facts respecting his conduct, showing that the juror entertained strong bias or prejudice
against appellant and his witnesses, and in view of that
was disqualified to sit as a juror in the case.
Chief Justice Frick at page 70 of the Utah Report,
say.s, as quoted by the appellant in the case at bar:
"If a juror is actually guilty of misconduct, one
or more of the other jurors may testify to the facts
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constituting the alleged misconduct, or the same may
be proved by any witness who observed and knows
the facts. ''
But the appellant did not quote the further statement of
Justice Frick, to-wit:
"It is well settled, however, that the alleged misconduct of a juror may not be established by merely
proving his declarations.''
And quoting further from the same case, Chief Justice
Frick says:
"It is elementary that a juror may not be heard
to impeach his own verdict. If that were permitted,
one, or perhaps more, of the jurors could be found
in every case who, for the sake of appeasing the
wrath or soothing the feelings of the losing party,
would disclose .something for which it could be
claimed the verdict should be set aside. Indeed, a
juror, or even a number of them, might agree to a
verdict with that end in view. The law, therefore,
wisely provides that a juror may not disclose facts
which would go in impeachment of his verdict; and
what a juror may not do directly may not be done
indirectly by proving the declarations of a juror."
And the court in this particular case found that the evidence contained in the affidavits, was not admissible
upon sound public policy.
In fact, the case of Black vs. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel.
Co., reported in 26 Utah 451, 73 Pac. page 514, it was
decided that "Under Rev. St. 1898, 3292, subd. 2, providing that, when any one or more of the jurors, has been
induced to assent to a verdict by resorting to the de-
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termination of chance, such misconduct may be proved
by the affidaYit of any one of thP jurors, 1nisconduct other
than that specified cannot be e8tablished on a motion for
a new trial by the juror's affidavit."
Revised Statutes of Utah 1~98, 3~9:2 subd. 2, is substantially the same as ReYised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
104-40-2, subd. ~. Under the ruling of this case it would
seem well established that misconduct other than that
where it appears that one or more of the jurors has been
induced to assent to a verdict by resorting to chance,
cannot be introduced by affidavit of a juror, and likewise
the same rule would apply to the testimony of a juror.
The case of Hamilton Y. Snyder, 18~ \Vash. 688, 48
Pac. (2nd) 245, which the appellant has cited, was a case
where on affidavit of some of the jurors it was shown the
jury took an informal ballot, resulting in 11 for defendant
and 1 for plaintiff. Following this the jury requested
that the court's instructions be read and a formal ballot
taken. The foreman signed the verdict for the defendant
and announced there was no need for the jury to consider the case further. Protests were made by some of
the jurors who announced they would vote differently on
a formal ballot. Other jurors joined in the request for a
formal ballot which the foreman refused, and the verdict
was returned into court. The jury was then polled and 10
of them answered that the verdict was their verdict, while
two answered no. The court in this case assumed that
the attitude and actions of the foreman were dictatorial,
dogmatic, and wholly improper but Justice Tolman on
page 246, said :
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"We have little actual knowledge of what takes
place within the jury room, but it is not going too
far, we think, to say that frequently the strong characters dominate the weaker ones and to open the
door to testimony showing such practices would be
to imperil every verdict hereafter rendered and
make jury trials most uncertain in their results.''
Lastly the appellant has cited the case of Jensen vs.
Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366 at page 400; 270 Pac. 349, 362,
attempting to show by a brief citation from this case,
that where the committed error is of such nature or character as calculated to do harm, or on its face as having
the natural tendency to do so, prejudice will be presumed,
until the record is affirmatively shown that the error
was not or could not have been of harmful effect.
But where in the case at bar has the appellant shown
committed error 1
The court in the above cited case further said quoting
from page 400 of the Utah Report :
''The burden, of course, is on the appellant to
show, not only error, but :prejudicial effect as well.
But how may he .show that~ It often has been broadly stated that all error:s are presumed to be prejudicial. We think the better rule is that not all
committed errors in the trial of a case are presumptively or prima facie prejudicial, for some committed
errors are merely abstract, or on their face immaterial, or otherwise are not in and of themselves calculated to do harm. Still the party against whom the
error was committed may show by the record that it
resulted to his prejudice in some substantial right.''
The appellant in the case at bar certainly has not
shown committed error or misconduct of the jury prej-
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udicial to him, and it is the (•ontention of respondent that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to
grant the motion for new trial.

POINT "D"
Appellant by his last point D, sPeks to show that the
last vote of the jurors was influenced by the information sent to the jury by the judge in this case. The jury
sent a request to the judge for further instructions while
deliberating their Yerdict and plaintiff contends that the
word sent back by the judge influenced the jury to such
an extent that immediately a ballot was taken to get rid of
the case. The judge refused to give any additional instruction and sent word back to the jury to read the instructions given and decide the case thereon. I do not
see how plaintiff can contend that any prejudicial error
resulted from this. If the plaintiff felt that the jury
needed more instructions it 'vas his duty to have raised
such issue when the verdict was returned. The :Plaintiff
not having done so, this issue cannot be raised before the
court at this time.
The case of Harlan v. Taylor, decided by the Supreme
Court of California, and reported in 33 Pacific (2nd)
page 422, states :
"Where jury requested additional instructions,
but court at time was engaged in trial of another
case and offered to comply with request as soon as
convenient, and jury, without receiving additional
instructions, returned verdict, plaintiff, not having
raised point regarding additional instructions when
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verdict was returned, held to have waived irregularity, if any."
Abbott's Trial Brief, Civil Jury Trials, Second Edition, on page 484, states:
"But after the jury have retired, the judge is
not bound to comply with a party's request to give
additional instructions upon a point not covered by
a request of the jury; nor to comply with a party's
request to give the jury further instructions by way
of explanation or modification of those already
given; for it is a matter within the discretion of the
court.''
And there are other numerous cases in support of this
contention.

CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the plaintiff has utterly
failed to produce or bring forth to the court any evidence whatsoever that would show any errors committed by the jury in this action, prejudicial to the plaintiff, and that the judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
J. VERNON ERICKSON,
Attorney fo'r Defendant and Respondent.
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